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Abstract 
The basic objective of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme 
(MGNREGP) is to provide safety net for the rural poor and to stabilize agricultural production 
through creating productive assets via employing labourers. Two important linked aspects are 
worth noting in respect of implementation of the programme. Implementation of MGNREGP in 
multiple cropping areas can increase the employment opportunities among the landless 
agricultural labourers and thus has inevitably raised their bargaining power particularly during 
the time of second crop i.e. post rainy season cultivation. Besides this, Government of India has 
persistently been hiking per man-day MGNREGP wage. Both these instances undoubtedly 
increase the reservation wage in agricultural labour market which in turn may have an adverse 
effect on the farm income in the multicropping areas. In this paper, maximum possible per man-
day MGNREGP wage is determined at which the corresponding agricultural wage can help the 
marginal farmers to sustain their net farm income at least at subsistence level. This paper also 
establishes the fact that as a result of the hike of MGNREGP wage, sustenance of subsistence net 
farm income may lead to price hike in agricultural sector. The study also attempts to analyze the 
results in respect of aggregate net pecuniary benefits of the rural poor in the light of MGNREGP 
considering different agricultural frameworks.  
Key words: National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme, Agricultural Labour Market, 
Net farm income, Aggregate net benefit, Material cost  
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IMPACT OF MAHATMA GANDHI NATIONAL RURAL 
EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE PROGRAMME (MGNREGP) ON 
THE RURAL POOR- A SIMPLE THEORETICAL DISCOURSE 
 
I.  Introduction: 
Government of India has initiated National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme which is 
presently known as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme 
(MGNREGP) where the basic objective is to provide 100 full man-days of employment to each 
willing rural household. It is expected that MGNREGP can generate income support for the poor 
and can raise agricultural productivity as well as profitability in the long run through creating 
different productive assets related to agriculture. As for example, the Employment Guarantee 
Programme (EGP) in Maharastra was able to avert famine during draught of 1970-73 and 
reduced poverty while Rural Public Works Programme in Bangladesh has been commented to its 
contribution to rural development and increased agricultural productivity through the creation 
and maintenance of rural infrastructure (Dreze and Sen, 1991). Employment generation through 
MGNREGP emphasized its role in income insurance in the presence of seasonality in 
agricultural labour market (Basu, 2011). Dev (1995) reported that Maharashtra EGP and 
agricultural employment were complementary in the sense that EGP employment was high in 
lean season (April-July) and low in peak season (October – January). He had shown that in two 
villages within Maharashtra, negative correlation was observed between the EGP employment 
and agricultural employment where the values were -0.68 and -0.33 respectively. On the basis of 
this he concluded that MGNREGP should not complete with agricultural labour hiring decision. 
Besides that this programme will generate productive assets which can directly influence 
agricultural productivity as well as profitability in the long run. The „productive assets‟ include 
water harvesting, construction of irrigation canals, land development, flood control to reduce 
vulnerability of rural people and improvement of rural connectivity.  
Initially the contemplation was that the employment be provided mainly in the agricultural slack 
season when the rural poor especially the landless labourers are absolutely jobless. But to reach 
the target and for proper utilization of funds, the local panchayats sometimes offer job under 
MGNREGP even in the agriculturally busy season in the multiple cropping framework mainly 
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during the time of cultivation after rainy season. Then, the agricultural labour households have 
two choices: either the labourer can work as an agricultural labourer or he can work under 
MGNREGP.  The small as well as marginal farmers
1
 also have two choices. He can start 
agricultural production for second crop with the help of hired and family labourers or he can 
engage himself and his family members to work under MGNREGP on the basis of assumption 
that all the working members of the marginal farm households are job card holders. This actually 
increases the bargaining power of the local labourers and the land holders of farmer households 
need to raise wage of the workers during the time of hiring in order to get ready availability of 
labour. Basu et.al. (2009) developed a theoretical model to analyze different implications of such 
public policy in the context of labour market. According to them such programme introduces 
„contestability‟ in the agricultural labour market where government and the land-lord class are 
two different employers. They had shown that the outcome with respect to wages and overall 
level of employment in the labour market depends on the degree of distributional concern of the 
planners. In effect, implementation of MGNREGP raises the reservation wage of the agricultural 
labourers in an imperfectly competitive rural labour market which may reduce private 
employment in standard framework. 
The government can influence the MGNREGP piece rate in two ways (i) it can enhance the wage 
rate keeping the task unchanged or (ii) can reduce the task at unchanged wage rate. In this 
theoretical framework both the possibilities will be considered. 
According to the recommendation of the expert committee set up by the Union Rural 
Development Ministry, piece rate of MGNREGP should be the minimum wage fixed by the 
respective state. The panel also recommended linking of the per man-day piece rate to the 
consumer price index of rural labourers for protecting MGNREGA piece rate against inflation. 
But hike of farm wage is observed after the hike of MGNREGP piece rate.  Report of the 
Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices (2012), Government of India has argued that 
MGNREGP has been one of the factors that has contributed to increase in agricultural wages. 
The report mentioned that the trend in real wage of the farm labourers irrespective of gender 
increased at a slower pace between 2000-2004, but thereafter the real farm wage has increased 
                                                          
1
 Farmers who own up to 1 hector of land are called marginal farmers and farmers who own up to 
1-2 hector land are called small farmers.  
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significantly which coincides the phase of MGNREGP implementation. Haque (2013) comments 
that the MGNREGP has resulted in substantial increase in the market wage rates of agricultural 
and non agricultural labourers and also makes a note that the fact is confirmed by the NSSO 66
th
 
Round. Reddy (2013) reports that the introduction of MGNREGP with minimum and equal 
wages for male and female workers, did bring about not only an increase in the overall 
agricultural wages but also reduction in the male-female wage differentials. According to him, 
wage increases were reported in a number of states like Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat and West 
Bengal etc. and higher wages in MGNREGP has diverted workers from agriculture and has 
created labour shortages in agriculture.  
In this situation, incorporating the stylized facts in a theoretical model we try to find the 
maximum permissible hike of MGNREGP wage which can sustain the minimum net farm 
income of the small and marginal farmers from secondary agricultural production activities. The 
basic objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the hike of MGNREGP wage on net 
farm income and employment generation in agricultural labour market. This is dealt with in 
section II where as section III investigates the status of aggregate net benefit as envisaged in 
different agricultural contexts. It also focuses on the responsiveness of aggregate net benefit with 
respect to relevant policy parameters. Section IV concludes. 
Section II. The General Framework of the Model: 
There is no uncertainty in this model and it is assumed that all the farm households are marginal 
famer households. We here consider two types of economic agent in the village economy: (i) the 
marginal farmers who cultivate their own land with the help of family labour force and hired 
labourers and (ii) the landless agricultural labourers. We also assume that all the adult members 
of representative marginal farmer households are job card holders and only the agricultural 
labourer holds the job card.
 
 
Consider a marginal farmer household
2
 who cultivates his own land with the help of family 
labour force denoted as FL  and hired agricultural labourers denoted as HL .  
                                                          
2 In terms of numbers, India at present has about 82 million landless labourer and 80 million 
small and marginal farmers who also have to work as an agricultural labourer (Ministry of 
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It is assumed that two kinds of labourers are replaceable by one another as regards the nature of 
job to be done
3
  
The normal working hour of each labourer is 1 and each family labourer has to work more than 
the normal working hour and the extra hour is denoted as „ H ‟. Here ),0( HH   where H  
indicates maximum hours a family labourer can work more than the normal working hour. So 
total labour hour used in the production process of a single household will be })1({ HF LHL  . 
Now if „E‟ be the effort level4 devoted by each labourer in each hour then the agricultural 
production function for each farmer will be
5
  
                                 ELHLAY HF })1({  …………………..(1)  where )1,0( .  
Here we hypothesize that the representative marginal farmer household sells her entire crop and 
„P‟ is the price per unit of the produced crop. Again „A‟ is a parameter standing for inputs other 
than labour and irrigation, such as capital goods required during the time of agricultural 
production, viz- hand tractor, fertilizers etc. Since we consider only marginal farmers and 
moreover they are considered as homogeneous, so the size of land and capital used can be 
considered same across different farming households. This implies that the cost of capital can be 
cross-sectionally taken as given. In this model we consider a developed agricultural framework 
with no suspension of work under MGNREGP except the rainy busiest season because during 
that time it is strictly guided that no MGNREGP project can be undertaken. So a labourer has to 
choose between doing job under MGNREGP or doing job as an agricultural labourer except that 
time period.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Agriculture 2000-01). In this model, we shall concentrate on the impact on net farm income only 
on marginal farmer households after gradual hike of MGNREGP wage.  
3
 In the model the rural poor consists of two sections- marginal farmers and landless labourers. 
Again in the absence of joint family system it has become hard to carry out agricultural activities 
only with the help of family labourers. Thus both kinds of labourers (family and hired) are 
needed. But they are identical in terms of the task they perform. 
4
 Here effort level (E) implies the effective physical and mental involvement a standard 
nourished worker devotes in each hour and is considered exogenous in the model. Thus with 
respect to a specific kind of work, E can be thought of as an impersonal attribute which remains 
invariant from person to person. 
5
 Like Neo classical type production function, labour measured in terms of hour is the only factor 
which influences the agricultural output. For the simplicity of this model, we assume that total 
man-day used in the production function is „1‟.   
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For the simplicity of the model we rule out the possibility of the availability of non-farm 
employment among the rural casual labourers in that locality.   
The entire theory is concerned with the agricultural production during the time of cultivation of 
the second crop which happens only after the completion of principle crop production conducted 
in the rainy season when no MGNREGP project can be undertaken. Thus our model presumes 
that choice between two options will arise during the time of second crop production in 
agriculturally developed region. Therefore the so called contestability arises only after the 
completion of rainy season.  
We have already mentioned that Government of India in last eight years has been gradually 
increasing the MGNREGP piece rate of each labourer for each man-day work. This MGNREGP 
piece rate most of the times seems attractive relative to non MGNREGP market wage and 
therefore bring the risk of upward wage pressure. So in the presence of MGNREGP, the landlord 
cum employers who have to depend on hired labour for cultivation need to raise wage of the 
workers they hire in order to ensure the necessary supply of labour. If WM is per man-day wage a 
labourer can earn through MGNREGP, then to get them employed the farmer offers MW to each 
hired labourer where it is implied that 1 which means each hired labourer is offered at least 
the MGNREGP wage otherwise it is not possible for him to avail their labour supply
6
.  Now we 
want to locate the maximum possible wage rate Government should offer under MGNREGP for 
one-man day work which leads the marginal farmers to continue their agricultural production 
rather than to stop it and entirely switch over to MGNREGP.  
Due to working in own family farm each family labourer sacrifices his (her) job under 
MGNREGP from which he can earn MW . Apart from that they also devote extra hour over and 
above the normal working hour in the production process.  In effect, their net farm income in 
agricultural production for second crop hinges on two factors. On the one hand, it depends upon 
the number of hired labourers and on the other hand, it depends upon the extra hour that the 
farmer has to devote to keep the agricultural production going. Thus if HL  is varied, then it will 
                                                          
6
 It is told that expansion of MGNREGP has boosted wage rate of agriculture by 5.3% on an 
average between 2010 and 2011. A study by T. Haque (2013) also reveals that in the district 
Dindigul of Tamil Nadu an increase in the agricultural wage rate by about 200 percent on an 
average was observed. 
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result in variation of H . Hence the net farm income function of the marginal farmer in second 
crop production can be expressed as 
222 )1(})1({),( EHLLWLWCELHLPALH FHMFMwHFH  
 …………(2) 
The last term on the R.H.S of equation (2) stands for the cost of effort
7
 incurred by the family 
labourers to do agricultural work. Cost of effort is expressed in monetary terms and depends on 
the substitutable choice variables H and HL  in case of agricultural production activities. The 
particular expression in equation (2) belies on the fact that it is convex in nature. wC is the cost of 
water for cultivation which has some potentiality to be explored in our future discussion. As the 
production is done simultaneously by family labourer and hired labourer, there is little possibility 
of the emergence of moral hazard problem among the hired agricultural labourers. So we can 
anticipate the presence of complete information in our model and hence the effort level devoted 
by each hired labourer in each hour in the production process is observable and same as that in 
case of family labourers and there is little possibility of shirking among the hired labourers.  
Only other alternative of each farm household is to work under MGNREGP when the feasibility 
of agricultural production comes at stake. Now if the farm household does not carry out 
agricultural production and want to work under MGNREGP then the net earnings of that 
household will be 
REaLWeL FMF 
 222  …………………………… (3) 
Here „R‟ is the implicit cost incurred by the farm household for not using the available land for 
agricultural purposes. The framework of the model conceives that the rural poor comprises of 
marginal farmers and landless agricultural labourers. Again there is homogeneity among the 
farming households in respect of land holding. Hence the possibility of leasing out the land is 
negated as there is no farmer who can take the lease for cultivation. So a farmer either cultivates 
his land with the help of family labourers and hired labourers or leaves the land uncultivated. 
)10(222  aEaLF  is the cost of effort incurred by the family labourers to do work under 
                                                          
7
 Cost of effort in general in the model signifies the flavor of opportunity cost of giving effort to 
do the task either in agriculture or in MGNREGP. In other words, it may be synonymous with 
the concept of disutility of work. 
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MGNREGP
8
. Since the Government can time to time change this work effort to be devoted to 
MGNREGP, therefore ' a ' can be conceived of as a policy parameter in our analysis. Besides that a 
labourer after doing job through MGNREGP does not get wage instantly, rather it takes some 
time. So the labouer has to bear a few „patience cost‟9 to get wage through MGNREGP from 
his/her bank account and that is why we have taken a discounted wage income with  as the 
discounting factor. It must be noted that with increase in delay of payment,  increases. 
Now a farm household will concentrate on agricultural production rather than sending their 
entire family labour force to do job under MGNREGP only if    . 
There is a possibility that MGNREGP crowds out agricultural employment. This may lead to 
lower participation of the poor in the agricultural labour market. On the other hand, higher wages 
in agriculture will reduce the demand for labour.  
Suppose there are „N‟ numbers of agricultural labour households and each labour household has 
only one member who supplies labourer in the labour market. The labourer has two options: (i) 
working under the farm household as an agricultural labourer where the wage rate is more than 
the wage rate offered under MGNREGP and the payment is instantaneous, but have to work 
extensively or (ii) work under MGNREGP where the wage rate is less if we compare that with 
agricultural wage rate, the payment is delayed but the effort devoted to do one man-day of work 
is far less than what is required as an agricultural labourer. We have already mentioned that the 
cost of effort incurred by each labourer doing job under MGNREGP is expressed as 22Ea  . So 
the net earnings of a labourer after doing one man-day job under MGNREGP will be 
                                                          
8 During our village level survey in three gram panchayats of South 24 Parganas district and 
seven gram panchayats of Birbhum district of West Bengal, it is observed that to do one may day 
work under MGNREGP, each labourer has to dig only 50 cubic feet soil which a standard 
nourished worker can do within 4 hours and according to them the effort they have to devote to 
complete this job is almost half of effort they have to devote to do work as an agricultural casual 
labourer in one day where the working hour is not less than 8 hours.  
9
 According to the MGNREGP guideline, payment for worker should be made within 14 days of 
the completion of the work. However delay in payment and incorrect payments are common 
problems here. The delay can be for several weeks or sometimes months. Often workers have to 
make several visits to the bank/post office to find that their wages have not been credited to their 
accounts. Sometimes delay is also caused because works under MGNREGP are carried out 
without proper approval.  
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22EaWeE MNREGA 
 ……………..(4) 
Now from equation (4) we have  


 





eW
E
andeW
E
M
NREGA
M
NREGA
2
2
0 >0 
So ENREGA curve is downward sloping and convex in nature with respect to  . At  = 0, i.e. 
when payment is instantaneous  
                         
22EaWE MNREGA  ……………(4A) 
Again the net earnings of a labourer after finishing one man-day work as „hired‟ agricultural 
labourer will be 
                                       2EWE MAG    ……..(5) 
It is clear that AGE is independent of  .  
Proposition-1: Instant payment in MGNREGP work with given relaxation of assigned job under 
MGNREGP will reduce the availability of labourers during agricultural production under 
certain condition even if they are paid more than MGNREGP wage.  
Proof. At  =0 , ENREGA > EAG  provided MWaE )1()1(
22     i.e. the extra sacrifice a 
labourer has to do in terms of effort to work as an agricultural labourer is more than the net gain 
he can enjoy as an agricultural labourer in terms of wage.  
Now a labourer will prefer to work as an agricultural labourer rather than working under 
MGNREGP if and only if NREGAAG EE  and that can happen after a certain value of    say 

 
(>0) which can be called as the critical value of ρ at which the net earnings of a labourer under 
MGNREGP is just equal to EAG (See appendix I) i.e. when  > AGE,

> NREGAE  
So in Fig-1 at NREGAAG EE  ,

.  
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 Determining critical value of ρ beyond which work through MGNREGP will not be demanded 
 
Fig-1 is drawn based on the premise that the required condition in proposition 1 holds true. From 
Fig-1 it is obvious that when   is less than 

 then it will be difficult for a farm household to 
hire agricultural labourer during the time of production even after offering wage more than WM 
because at that situation the rational labourer will always prefer to work under MGNREGP 
where he has to devote less effort and get payment within short duration after completing one 
may-day work. So if government initiates payment system within short duration under 
MGNREGP then demand for work under MGNREGP will increase and it will be difficult to 
have labour supply in the agricultural production even at much higher wage in post rainy season 
cultivation. 
For the mobility of our model, we stick to 

  and hence  >   and HH  . 
Securing job through MGNREGP entirely depends on the willingness of the job seekers. If a 
labourer seeks job through MGNREGP, then local panchayat is bound to provide employment 
for them. But if 

 , then employment will be generated in agriculture and the labourers who 
fail to get job as farm labourers will work through MGNREGP. So in our model, agricultural 
production can be done if and only if 

  because then  > . 
Now considering 

  and   >   we ultimately have the following optimization problem of 
the farm household  
222 )1(})1({),( EHLLWLWCELHLPALHMax FHMFMwHFH  
 ……(6) 
Fig – 1 
EAG 
ENREGA 
o   
EAG ENREGA 
WM-a
2E2 
 


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From Eq.(6), we have  
22)1( )1(2})1({0 EHLELHLPA
H
FHF 

  

……….(7) 
MHF
H
WELHLPA
L

  

  )1(})1({0 ……………..(8) 
Eq.(7) and Eq.(8) give the optimum values of „H‟ and „LH‟ say 
*H and *HL . The Second order 
condition is checked in the appendix- II 
From Eq.(7) and (8) we can say 
MF WEHL 
2*2 )1(2  ………………..(9) 
Therefore,                           1
2 22
* 
EL
W
H
F
M  
On the other hand, 
2
1
1
*
2
}{
EL
W
EPA
W
L
F
MM
H





   (See appendix-III) 
 Now we shall investigate about the consequence in agricultural employment generation and 
production in agricultural sector after hike of MGNREGP wage. 
Proposition-2: Higher wage in MGNREGP tempts the marginal farmer households to reduce the 
employment of hired labourers.  
Proof: From above, we have  
0
2
}{
1 2
1
1
1*




 

ELEPA
W
W
L
F
M
M
H 






………(10) 
Proposition 3: Higher wage in MGNREGP tempts the family labourers to devote more hours for 
agricultural production.  
Proof: From Eq.(9), we have  
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0
2 22
*



eLW
H
FM

……….(11) 
So if government wants to increase WM then HH   which implies the marginal farmer 
households will reduce the recruitment of hired labourers and its own family labour force will 
have to work more than the normal working hour. This establishes the fact that )(* MWHH   
and ).(* MHH WLL  . 
Hence the indirect optimum net farm income function of the marginal farmer will be  
22*2**** )}(1{)()]()}(1{[ EWHLWLWLWCEWLWHLPA MFMHMFMWMHMF  
                                                                                
…………………………………………..(12) 
Applying Envelope theorem we have  
*
*
HF
M
LL
dW
d


    < 0  ……….(13) 
M
H
M
W
L
dW
d



*
2
*2


  > 0 ………..(14) 
So the maximum net farm income curve of the marginal farmer is negatively sloped and convex 
in nature which establishes the fact that with the increase of WM the maximum net farm income 
of the marginal farmer household will decrease. So we have to find the critical value of WM 
beyond which the farm household will stop agricultural production for the second crop. 
Here MM WWMin

)( (see fig-2) i.e. the MGNREGP wage will never become zero but its 
possible subsistence level is denoted as MW

. We have also mentioned that a marginal farmer 
household will continue his production as long as it earns at least more than . From equation 
(3) it is clear that   curve is positively slopped and a straight line with respect to WM. Now at 
MW

, * > . In figure-2 „k1‟ is the intersection point of these two curves where 
* curve 
intersects   from above and the corresponding level of WM will be MWˆ (say) where the farm 
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household will be indifferent between his two options in terms of earnings. At  *,ˆMW  
holds.(See Appendix IV) 
Now when  increases to  , there will be change in the critical value of . When  
 then   (say), i.e, the prospective MGNREGP workers will be willing to keep more 
patience than the previous situation if the government hikes the MGNREGP wage per man day 
towards a limiting value. So at , the labour will be available for agricultural production when
. Hence when  , no farmer will be willing to start agricultural 
production at unchanged P and A, because, then  
Hence under the above circumstances, for sustainability of agricultural production in post rainy 
season, government should not hike one man-day wage under MGNREGP beyond MWˆ . The 
following fig-2 also establishes the fact that if due to political pressure or any populist policy, 
government plans to hike MGNREGP wage beyond MWˆ then for survival purposes the farmer will have 
no other option but to hike the price of the agricultural commodity which ultimately may create 
agricultural price inflation in the economy. It is observed from figure-2 that when 
),ˆ( MMM WWW   the farmer has no other alternative but to increase the price of the product to 
make production at least profitable. In Fig-2, the new net farm income curve is denoted as **   
when the crop price is increased from P0 to P1. Other wise beyond MWˆ with    ,   > *
which establishes the fact that the farm household has to stop his agricultural production and 
engage totally in MGNREGP
10
.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Here it should be mentioned that like Neo-classical type labour market, hike of WM will not 
reduce employment generation through MGNREGP because this public policy is entirely funded 
by government whose main objective is to generate employment as much as possible.  
MW MWˆ  MW 
MWˆ  

MWˆ
    andWW MM
ˆ
.*  
 14 
           
 
 
                                    
 
 
 
 
 
Determining the critical value of MW and citing the possibility of price hike 
 
III. Perspective on Aggregate Net Pecuniary Benefit of the rural poor in presence of 
MGNREGP.  
There is a growing concern that MGNREGP crowds out private employment (here employment 
in agriculture) because it is expected that expansion of MGNREGP may lead to lower 
participation of the poor in the private agricultural labour market. On the other hand, persistent 
hike in wages in private agricultural employment keeping in pace with the MGNREGP wages 
will also reduce the demand for labour in private labour market and hence labour may switch 
over from private to public employment. In this background that it is required to investigate the 
extent of aggregate net pecuniary benefit of the rural poor (viz. marginal farmers and agricultural 
labourers) in different contexts such as double cropping and mono cropping regions. 
In India, bi-cropping areas cultivate „aman‟ and „boro‟ crops so far as paddy cultivation is 
concerned. The former is cultivated in rainy season when no (minimum) irrigation facilities are 
required. On the other hand, „boro‟ crops are cultivated in the winter season when proper 
irrigation facility is necessary. Moreover, in this season, fertilizers and other inputs are also 
compulsorily used up. In the present set up we incorporate these features of agriculture and also 
MW  
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presume the nature of employment of labour similar to that in agriculturally developed set up 
considered in our earlier discussion. 
 We consider a rural economy where there are n number of homogeneous marginal farmers and 
N number of equally efficient agricultural labourers. Here we subscribe the idea that    is the 
total earnings of a farmer household if he does not get involved in agricultural activity in the 
winter or second crop production season. On the other hand,   is again the profit of a farmer 
household from agricultural activity for second crop production in the winter season.
11
 
Moreover, we consider the parameter „A‟ as before denoting the capital goods used up in 
agriculture not linked with MGNREGP works. We further hold that P = 1. Now we consider 
static one period (say one year) aggregate net benefit function of the rural poor in a village 
economy in different situations on the basis of the following assumptions.  
It is assumed that Aggregate net benefit functions of different agents have one to one 
correspondence and monotonic relationship with their respective influencing factors, viz, profit 
for farmers and wage income for landless labourers etc. The analysis is also based on the belief 
that all adjustments and readjustments pertaining to wage and employment of labourers have 
already taken place. Now two possible contexts will be narrated.  
Context-1: Suppose     implying that the agricultural production activity is profitable even 
in a bi-cropping set up for both seasons and the required number of agricultural labourers 
working in agriculture is HnL  which remains same in all seasons. In this set up, both cropping 
seasons are more or less peak seasons which are defined as the busiest times with numerous jobs 
on the field. The remaining )( HnLN   workers will work under MGNREGP. It is confirmed 
that   and/ or MM WW
ˆ  which ensures relative unattractiveness towards MGNREGP 
works
12
. Here M is the marginal product or average product in MGNREGP work apart from 
renovation of water bodies which facilitates irrigation.  
                                                          
11
 See earlier exposition where   and 
 
are carrying the same meaning.
       
 
12
 See the earlier section. Here we add the assumption that only those labourers who do not find 
any agricultural work join MGNREGP. Hence non existence of rural unemployment is here 
considered. 
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It is also assumed that M  is directly proportional to the material cost involved in the 
MGNREGP project say, Z, such as ZM   (where   is constant of proportionality and   > 0).  
Now the aggregate net benefit function in context 1, i.e, 1B  comprises of four parts.  
(i). The first part is the net real value of output of n farmers in agricultural work in the two 
seasons (viz, aman and boro), 
])1(222})1({})1({[ 222 EHnLLWnLnWCELHLnAELHLnA FHMFMwHFHF  

 
Here wC is the extra cost of provisioning for agricultural work (say, cost of water) during second 
crop production season (viz, boro season) which is not environmentally congenial. wC  is 
considered to be a decreasing function of material cost (Z) say, wC = 22Z

. Here 
enhancement of Z will reduce the cost of irrigation, because the major works done under 
MGNREGP is digging of soil for construction of canals in public land to facilitate irrigation.
13
 
Moreover Z in no case here influences A, it will reduce the cost of cultivation mainly in winter 
season. 
(ii). The second part is the value of output generated under MGNREGP, )( HM nLN  .  
(iii). The third component of B1 is Net wage incomes of hired labourers in agricultural work, 
]22[ 22 EnLLnW HHM   
(iv). The last part includes net wage income earned through MGNREGP work 
 ])()([ 222 EanLNnLNWe HHM 
 . 
                                                          
13
 According to MGNREGA SAMEEKSHA (2012) published by Ministry of Rural 
Development, Government of India, with renovation of water bodies, water is available in the 
canals for up to eight months in a year and this has allowed the farmers to provide 3–6 additional 
watering to their paddy crops, the renovation increased the crop productivity by around 6–15 per 
cent, the bulk of the benefits for the farmers came in the form of diesel saving as they were able 
to replace costly well-irrigation. 
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Context-2: In monocropping region, when   for the second crop production, then the 
agricultural production activity becomes non-profitable in case of second crop production 
because all the agricultural labourers join MGNREGP. Moreover, the farmer household also 
joins MGNREGP after incurring the opportunity cost of not using the land.     and/or  
MM WW
ˆ   hold true which makes MGNREGP work attractive. Thus the region remains 
monocropping where no contestability remains from the point of view of either farmers or 
landless labourers. Rather, in this case MGNREGP supplements agriculture. 
In this case, the specification of the aggregate net benefit function is same as that in context 1 
albeit difference in expressions.  
(i). The first part is the net real value of output of n farmers in agricultural work as far as first 
crop production (viz, aman production) is concerned,  
])1(})1({[ 222 REHnLLWnLnWELHLnA FHMFMHF  
 .  
(ii). The second part is the value of output generated under MGNREGP, )( FM nLN  .  
(iii) The third part covers the net wage incomes of hired labourers in agricultural work, 
}{ 22 EnLLWn HHM    
(iv). The last part is composed of the net wage income earned through MGNREGP work, 
})()({ 222 EaNnLNnLWe FFM 
 .                                   
  Hence, the aggregate net benefit B2 can be expressed as: 
)16....(..............................)()()(
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As in the above instance there is distinct compartmentalization of the two activities (agriculture 
and MGNREGP), hence there is complementarities between them as far as yearly allocation of 
time is concerned yielding no trade off or contestability framework. 
The basic objective of MGNREGP is not only to generate employment among rural labourers in 
post rainy season, but also to create some assets so that the region can be converted in to at least 
double cropping regions. So 𝐵1 ≥ 𝐵2  is here considered.  
Again 21 BB   if 
 
2
2222
2222
2
)()(})1({
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Z
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FHMFHHFFM
HFHF

 




 
Which implies that the resultant benefit from bi-cropping nature of cultivation and potential 
implicit cost of expansion of MGNREGP is more than the potential explicit as well as the 
implicit costs of agriculture in general and of bi-cropping context in particular and potential 
benefits from MGNREGP. The following course of analysis will proceed on the basis of the 
above condition.  
 
The character of the present theory implies that the aggregate net benefit of the rural poor 
consists of the interests of two sections, viz, marginal farmer households and agricultural 
labourers. Hence, the aggregate net benefit of the rural poor can be influenced by altering two 
crucial endogenous decision variables, viz, H and HL . Now our aim is to maximize 1B  with 
respect to H and HL  and analyze the nature of responsiveness of optimum 1B   with respect to 
ZWM , ,   and a which can be regarded as the policy parameters here. Thus we have the 
optimization problem as discussed below where the underlying constraints are   and/or 
    𝑊𝑀 < 𝑊𝑀 .  
Max ),(1 HLHB = 
 ELHLnA HF })1({2 22Z
 222 )1(22 EHnLLnW FFM  + Z
222)( EnLnLN HH 
222)()( EanLNnLNWe HHM 
  
Now we have: 
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From equations (17) and (18) it appears that both H and HL can be solved in terms of ZWM ,,
and a  . Suppose that the optimum values of H and 
**
HH andLareHL  respectively. 
Proposition 4: Higher wage in MGNREGP reduces the employment of hired labourers in 
agriculture and in turn increases the extra hours put in agriculture by the family labourers 
From (17) and (18), we can write
14
  
)(24)1(4 *222*2*2 HMHF nLNEnaWneEnLZnEHnL 
 ………..(19) 
From (19) we have, 
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)2(2 22
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L
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


 
 < 0……(21) 
Hence the responsiveness of ** HandLH with respect to MW are respectively positive and negative. 
Therefore, the optimum values of H and LH respond in the same manner both in individual net 
farm income and aggregate net benefit contexts.  
Proposition 5: Due to more delay in payment of wages more rural landless labourers will be 
optimally willing to work as agricultural labourers ignoring the opportunity to work in 
                                                          
14
 It is quite clear that finding out the exact expression of *H and *HL needs further mathematical 
techniques. Hence we use equations (17) and (18) again to get the flavor of comparative static 
results. 
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MGNREGP, leading in turn to the fall in the extra hours  that the family labour force of the  
farmer household has to devote in the agricultural work. 
From  (19) we have,        
0
4 22
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
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
EnL
eWnH
F
M


. ....... (22) 
And  
)2(2 22
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eWnL MH



 

> 0 …..(23) 
The result shows that as the wage payment in MGNREGP is delayed, the incentive towards 
joining in MGNREGP work falls. As a result, supply of agricultural labourers to the farming 
households increases resulting in the fall in the extra hours over and above the normal hours that 
a farmer household has to devote in the agricultural work. 
Proposition 6: In the short run increase in the material cost enhances the extra effort measured 
in terms of hours devoted by farming households in agriculture and on the other hand reduces 
the optimum demand for agricultural labourers in the agricultural activity. 
Again from equation (19), we have, 
  0
4 22
*



EnL
n
Z
H
F

……(24) 
And 0
)2(2 22
*





nanE
n
Z
LH  ….(25) 
The intuition is that an increase in the allocation of material cost increases the productivity of 
agricultural land. As a result, agricultural output increases at unchanged level of employment. 
This induces farming households at least in the short run to put extra effort in terms of hours in 
agriculture followed by reduction in demand for hired labourers.  
Proposition 7: If there is increase in the effort level to be put in MGNREGP work, then the 
optimum agricultural employment of hired labourers will rise with a corresponding fall in the 
extra effort in terms of hours devoted by farming households. 
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Again from equation (19), we have, 
    
2
* )(
F
H
L
nLNa
a
H 



<0………….(26) 
And )(
*
H
H nLNa
a
L



>0………(27) 
One of the lucrative facts towards joining MGNREGP is the lower effort level vis a vis the 
agricultural work considering the corresponding wage payment. So if that effort requirement to 
complete on man-day MGNREGP work becomes high, then the casual labourers have no reasons 
to stick to MGNREGP with a lower wage as compared with agricultural work with a higher 
wage and high level of effort. 
The ongoing analysis has established the fact that ),,,(* aZWHH M   and 
).,,,(* aZWLL MHH   Hence the optimum aggregate net benefit function of the rural poor will 
be  
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Proposition 8: Enhancement of MGNREGP wage increases the optimum aggregate net benefit of 
the rural poor if the relative size of the agriculturally unemployed labourers is sufficiently large. 
With the help of Envelope theorem we have, 
  
MdW
dB 1
*
 = FMH nLWnLNe 2)}({
*  ……..(28)  
The responsiveness of maximum aggregate net benefit of the rural poor with respect to 
MGNREGP wage is conditional upon the size of agriculturally unemployed labour force vis-à-
vis the size of family labour force in a particular village economy. If 
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0,2)}({
*
1* 
M
FMH
dW
dB
thennLWnLNe   and vice versa. Hence the model prescribes for clear 
mapping of employment status in area specific manner. 
Proposition 9: The responsiveness of maximum aggregate net benefit function with respect to the 
delay in payment of wages is unconditionally negative. 
Although   is subjective and depends on individual‟s perception, yet    can be influenced by 
the government deliberately as a policy parameter without altering MW . From the optimum 
aggregate net benefit function of the rural poor, we have,  
0)}({ *
*
1   


HM nLNWe
d
dB
….(29) 
Presently wage payment through MGNREGP is done through bank account. This is undoubtedly 
a positive „financial inclusion‟ drive among the rural poor. This also has reduced the intensity of 
corruption at panchayat level during the time of wage payment. But the poor rural participants 
always want to get the payment instantly or with in very short time period after completion of 
job. Sometimes due to administrative inefficiency the payment is delayed and if that happens 
then that adversely impacts the maximum aggregate net benefit of the rural community in 
double- cropping areas. 
Proposition 10: Maximum aggregate net benefit function varies directly with the change in 
material cost. i.e, it is an increasing function of material cost. 
0)}({ *
3
*
1  ZnLN
ZdZ
dB
H

...........(30) 
Thus as allotment towards material cost in MGNREGP increases, aggregate net benefit of the 
rural poor unambiguously rises. So implementation of MGNREGP in a particular rural area can 
improve aggregate net benefit through enhancing the feasibility of multiple cropping system 
which can be regarded as a positive fall out of MGNREGP. 
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Proposition 11: Reduction of effort level required to complete one man-day work through 
MGNREGP enhances the aggregate net benefit of the rural poor. 
Suppose, to complete on man-day work through MGNREGP a labourer has to dig 80 cubic foot 
soil. But the government decides that a labourer can complete that after digging only 50 cubic 
foot soil. Then a labourer of MGNREGP has to devote less effort to complete one man-day 
work.   
From the optimum aggregate net benefit function we get  
0)}({2 *2
*
1  anLNaE
da
dB
H ……..(31) 
Given other parameters, if the government reduces the effort level required to complete one man 
-day work through MGNREGP then it unambiguously enhances the aggregate net benefit of the 
rural poor in the village economy. 
IV. Concluding observations:  
The constructive impact of MGNREGP has been undeniable. A rise in MGNREGP wage may 
create a positive economic impact in the sense that it can improve the livelihood of the rural 
poor. But it has also contributed to rise in farm input costs and withdrawal of labour from farm 
sector therefore adversely affecting agricultural operation and crop prices viz, food prices. The 
motivation behind the present theory emerges from this adverse impact of MGNREGP on the 
agricultural ambience. Section II ends up with a culmination point where ceteris paribus, 
enhancement of MGNREGP wage above a critical level will stop agricultural activity in post 
rainy season. Again, keeping an eye on the broad objective of the study (viz, impact of 
MGNREGP on the rural poor), we evaluate the same in section III by looking at the impact of 
introducing MGNREGP on aggregate net benefit of the rural poor under the auspices of two 
different agricultural circumstances. In this regard, a prominent observation is that there arises no 
conflict between agriculture and MGNREGP from the point of view of the rural poor in mono 
cropping contexts, rather MGNREGP supplements agricultural employment and income there. 
Thus it is found that the impact of changes in the relevant policy parameters on aggregate net 
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benefit in such contexts becomes redundant. But under certain conditions the double cropping 
systems will give more benefit for the rural poor than single cropping system. It is observed that 
hike of MGNREGP wage may not benefit the overall rural community. In other situations the 
effect is unambiguous. So we can have some policy recommendations:  
Policy implications: 
 The impact of MGNREGP and that of subsequently related policy changes need to be reassessed 
and it cannot be weighted in just political terms.  In a nutshell, there is requirement of context 
specific and region specific policy design and implementation especially pertaining to 
MGNREGP wage escalation. It also comes out from the model that delay in payment of 
MGNREGP wage and work effort criteria in MGNREGP are very important factors affecting the 
decision of a labourer in choosing between agricultural work and MGNREGP work. So a few 
policies related to some important aspects of MGNREGP are here suggested:  
1. Before hiking MGNREGP piece rate government should justify its practical impact on 
village economy because it should be remembered that it is not always possible for the 
small and marginal farmers to offer government declared minimum wage to his farm 
labourers. It is identified that enhancement of MGNREGP wage beyond a limiting value 
will stop agricultural production and government must refrain itself from reaching out 
that stage. Apprehension of proper rural employment scenario at village level is a 
prerequisite in this case. In double cropping region, areas with relatively large number of 
agriculturally unemployed casual landless labourers can only get the benefit of 
MGNREGP wage escalation and will make a positive impact on aggregate net pecuniary 
benefit to the rural poor.  
2. Delay in payment of wages has remained a disadvantageous aspect of MGNREGP since 
its inception. It is observed that the beneficiaries have the only concern regarding the 
implementation of MGNREGP that the payment should be made in due time. The 
existing theory clearly shows why it is so. Yet sustenance of agriculture in non rainy 
season may necessitate a delicate policy mix. If the government plans to raise the 
MGNREGP wage, it may be accompanied by increase in work effort criteria under 
MGNREGP and/or delay in payment of wages (  ˆ ) so that availability of labour to 
agriculture does not drastically fall. 
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3. MGNREGP work should always be done not only as employment generation programme 
but also in asset creation which can help the marginal farmers to improve their 
productivity as well as net farm income in their agricultural production resulting in a 
positive impact on the aggregate net benefit of the rural poor. This in turn necessitates an 
adequate increase in the allotment towards material cost in MGNREGP work as and 
when required.  
4. The government should arrange work per man-day under MGNREGP in such a way that 
the assigned labourer has to work at least 8 hours effectively without shirking. This can 
be exercised in mono-cropping regions and in those agriculturally developed regions 
where employment of agricultural labourers is sufficiently large, because in that case the 
adverse impact on aggregate net benefit is somewhat dampened. This type of programme 
implementation weakens the power of hindrance towards the supply of labour during the 
time of agricultural production.  
5. Last but not the least; a holistic policy suggestion is that the government should strictly 
instruct to local panchayat to arrange jobs through MGNREGP only in the agricultural 
slack season. All the regions in India are not equally developed in agriculture. In many 
parts of India, we observe the presence of multiple cropping and in those areas the casual 
labourers are getting job as agricultural labourers more than 150 days annually. If it is 
observed that the region is agriculturally developed and even the small farmers are 
cultivating their own land with the help of hired labour more than once in a year then 
government can reduce the target days of employment generation of each willing 
household from 100 man-days. This only can reduce the possibility of choice of an 
agricultural labourer between private employment and public employment through 
MGNREGP mainly in the agricultural peak season. This only can help the marginal 
farmers to make their cultivation profitable even at subsistence level through controlling 
their labour cost.  
Contribution, limitation and future scope of the study: 
The wage rates of agricultural labourers have substantially increased in recent years after the 
expansion of MGNREGP. Also there has been the phenomenon of workers getting diverted from 
agriculture and creating shortages of labour in agriculture due to higher wages in MGNREGP. 
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This model has abstracted the interplay through considering a village economy which consists of 
two types of vulnerable rural population sections, viz, marginal farmers and landless agricultural 
labourers. This paper explores the implications MGNREGP in the village economy and 
subsequent parametric shifts under the same on agricultural employment and income scenario. 
Moreover, farmers have improved their irrigated areas and changed the cropping patterns for 
realizing higher productivity and income in areas treated through MGNREGP works making it 
imperative to reorient wage cost and material cost composition under the scheme. The model has 
asserted this fact by depicting a favourable impact of material cost on aggregate net benefit of the 
rural poor.  
Bearing the protocol of a theoretical model, the present model is undoubtedly an abstraction 
from real life disruptions, thus, involving restrictions (eg, non stochasticity and static nature etc). 
Hence there can be considerable advancements made in the study in future by ameliorating with 
these restrictions.  
Thus in the context of substantial underemployment prevailing in rural areas, the extent to which 
the theory works is an empirical question. The model is based on total absence of private non-
farm employment and migration from/to other places. If those factors are incorporated then the 
rural labourers in post rainy season will have different types of employment opportunities. That 
situation may create different impact on local labour market. The impact of MGNREGP on 
private farm wages in such areas may not be much. The analysis is based on the condition that 
double cropping can generate much more benefit in the village economy than single cropping. It 
is required to empirically validate the propositions of the model which again leaves the scope for 
future research.  
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Appendix- II 
From equation (7) and equation (8) we have  
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Appendix- III 
From equation (8), we get 
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Appendix-IV 
The exact expression of MW

seems to be complicated here. But we come across below the final 
form of the equation solving which the exact value of MW

can be obtained. 
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